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I. INTRODUCTION
Enacted in 1975 as a modest work bonus and expanded substantially in 1993 as part of
welfare reform policy (Hoffman and Seidman, 2003; Ozawa, 1995), the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) is the largest anti-poverty social welfare program targeting working families in the
US (Nichols and Rothstein, 2016) providing nearly 29 million low-income tax filers with $68
billion in earnings subsidies (Hoynes and Rothstein, 2016). The EITC is a refundable tax credit
that comprises an important component of the social safety net for low- and moderate-income
(LMI) households (Bitler, Hoynes, and Kuka, 2017; Danziger, et al., 2002; Hoffman and
Seidman, 2003), helping these households cope with income and expense shocks (Tach et al.,
2019). The EITC is lauded for its low administrative costs and high take-up rate and more
importantly for its effectiveness in raising after-tax earnings and lifting working families with
children out of poverty (Dahl, DeLeire, and Schwabish, 2009; Gundersen and Ziliak, 2004;
Hardy, Smeeding, and Ziliak, 2018; Hoynes and Patel, 2018), though sharp reductions in the
credit when children age out reduces labor force participation (Moulton, Graddy-Reed, and
Lanahan, 2016).
The EITC conveys other, non-financial benefits. Recipients report psychological rewards,
including relief from stress associated with unpaid bills and the threat of utility cut-offs, and a
sense of social inclusion by receiving a non-stigmatized, work-related benefit (Sykes et al.,
2015). EITC receipt is also linked to healthy food purchases (McGranahan and Schanzenbach,
2013), health insurance coverage (Baughman, 2005) and improved birth (Hill and GurleyCalvez, 2019; Hoynes, Miller, and Simon, 2015), maternal health (Evans and Garthwaite, 2014)
and child development (Hamad and Rehkopf, 2016) outcomes.
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Still, the EITC has policy limitations and weaknesses due to its design as a refundable tax
credit. Recipients must wait until they file their federal income tax returns to receive lump sum
refunds from the credit – effectively providing a zero-interest loan to the federal government
(Jones, 2012). By contrast, other public assistance programs such as the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) offer monthly benefits to support immediate household
consumption (Holt, 2015). The decision to structure the EITC as a one time, lump-sum payment
may lead households to rely on credit or high-cost financial products to cover their expenses in
the months prior to EITC receipt; eligible households spend 5 percent of the value of the EITC
on credit card interest to smooth consumption (Jones and Michelmore, 2016).
On the other hand, lump sum tax refunds represent an opportunity for EITC recipients to
build emergency savings (Jones, 2012; Rhine et al., 2006; Smeeding, 2002) – short-term savings
that can be used (i.e., dissaved) by households to cope with dips income or spikes in expenses. In
the context of receiving tax refunds, saving all or part of one's refund can smooth consumption in
the months following tax filing. Weber (2016) found that EITC rules discourage saving for
recipients in the phase-out region, yet the study examined interest-bearing accounts as opposed
to no or low-interest savings accounts recipients would likely use for emergency and short-term
saving.
Though EITC recipients use tax refunds for many other purposes–paying overdue bills,
reducing debt, and making large purchases (Barrow and McGranahan, 2000; Mendenhall et al.,
2012; Sykes et al., 2015; Tach et al., 2018), LMI tax filers increase refund saving when they
receive encouragement, incentives, and facilitation (Azurdia and Freeman, 2016; Beverly,
Schneider, and Tufano. 2006; Beverly, Tescher, and Romich, 2004; Key et al., 2015; Tucker,
Key, and Grinstein-Weiss, 2014).
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Federal policy proposals may better promote refund saving among EITC recipients. The
Refund to Rainy Day Savings Act (S.1018) would significantly expand tax-time savings by
offering LMI households the opportunity to set aside 20 percent of their refund for six months to
receive a 50 percent match on the deferred portion (Halpern-Meekin et al., 2018). A similar bill
introduced in recent sessions of Congress, the Financial Security Credit Act, would provide a 50
percent match of refund amounts deposited into one of several eligible savings products. A
competing policy proposal is to offer periodic, advance payment of the EITC so that households
would receive a portion of their expected credit to help smooth consumption during the tax year
(Bellisle and Marzahl, 2015; Holt, 2015).
The purpose of this study is to inform EITC policy development related to tax-time
savings among LMI households in three ways. First, we draw on field experiments conducted in
2015 and 2016 to assess the effectiveness of randomly assigned message-based and choice
architecture interventions on refund savings allocations among a large sample of EITC recipients
who filed their federal income tax returns online. To our knowledge, this is the first study to
assess online tax-time savings intervention outcomes exclusively among a large sample of EITC
recipients using direct observations of savings behavior from administrative tax data. Second, we
use a survey experiment to test the feasibility of refund saving policy proposals by assessing the
probability that EITC recipients would defer a portion of their refund for six months if offered 0,
25, or 50 percent refund savings matches. Third, we assess whether refund saving behaviors and
preferences vary by refund amounts. Findings from our study can inform EITC policies
concerning savings message and deferred refund saving interventions to help EITC recipients
build emergency savings and cope with financial uncertainties.
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We find that interventions delivered in 2015 and 2016 have statistically significant
impacts on the refund saving take-up rate and on amounts of refunds saved among EITC
recipients that are largely independent of refund size. Although the magnitude of these impacts is
relatively modest, behavioral interventions delivered through an online tax filing platform that
reaches hundreds of thousands of tax filers can encourage refund savings among EITC recipients
to help cope with economic instability. We also find that modest savings incentives have the
potential to dramatically increase refund saving take-up among EITC recipients, and that refund
deferral preferences rise with the size of the refund. However, responses to hypothetical match
responses are mostly insensitive to refund amounts.
Our study arrives at an important time in tax policy, given the aforementioned policies to
promote savings, as well as the recently passed Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA), which
increases the child tax credit from $1,000 to $2,000 per child, the first $1,400 of which is
refundable. The TCJA did not alter the EITC or tax-time savings inducements for LMI filers, and
our findings can inform policymakers on how to help EITC recipients build emergency savings
amidst substantial economic constraints.
II. TAX REFUNDS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO BUILD EMERGENCY SAVINGS
Low- and moderate-income (LMI) households struggle with many forms of economic
instability – income volatility, periods of unemployment, public assistance cycling, and large,
unplanned expenses (Acs, Loprest, and Nichols, 2009; Despard et al., 2018a; Heflin, 2006;
Moore, Wood, and Rangarajan, 2012; Morduch and Siwicki, 2017; Pew Charitable Trusts,
2015a; Roll et al., 2017; Seefeldt, 2016). These sources of economic instability heighten risk for
material hardship (Despard et al., 2018b; Leete and Bania, 2010; McKernan, Ratcliffe, and
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Vinopal, 2009; Pilkauskas, Currie, and Garfinkel, 2012), such as food insecurity (Tarasuk,
McIntyre, and Li, 2007) and eviction (Desmond and Kimbro, 2015).
Having emergency savings–money set aside to use in the event of unexpected dips in
income or large expenses–lessens risk for material hardship (Gjertson, 2016; Lusardi, 1998;
McKernan et al., 2009), retirement account hardship withdrawals (Lusardi, 2011), and credit
dependence (Jones and Michelmore, 2016). However, LMI households typically lack sufficient
emergency savings. Most LMI households (85 percent) did not have enough in emergency
savings to cover at least three months of living expenses at the federal poverty level (McKernan
et al., 2009). Households in the bottom two income quintiles had liquid savings that could cover
only 9 and 15 days of regular living expenses, respectively (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2015b).
Thus, many LMI households may be ill-equipped to respond to economic instability without
experiencing hardship.
Tax refunds are irregular windfalls (Epley and Gneezy, 2007), more likely to be used to
increase savings than usual income (Mammen and Lawrence, 2006; Romich and Weisner, 2000).
The opportunity to build emergency savings is especially ripe for households which receive the
EITC, a refundable tax credit that offers a substantial financial benefit for qualifying households.
For the 2015 tax year, the average credit was $3,186 for families with children, though the
average credit is considerably lower for single filers ($293) (Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, 2016).
Despite the opportunity to build emergency savings at tax filing, there are several barriers
to promoting refund savings. First, LMI households often use tax refunds for other reasons
besides saving–overdue bills, debt reduction, home improvements and repairs, car repairs, and
large purchases (Halpern-Meekin et al., 2015; Mendenhall et al., 2012; Shaefer, Song, and
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Shanks, 2013; Smeeding, Phillips, and O'Connor, 2000; Sykes et al., 2015; Tach and Greene,
2014). Second, even if LMI tax filers do intend to save part or all their refund, a gap exists
between intention to save refunds and actual refund saving behavior. Mendenhall et al. (2012)
found that 57 percent of a sample of 194 EITC recipients followed over a six-month period
intended to save their refunds, but only 39 percent could meet their savings goals. Similarly,
Spader, Ratcliffe, and Stegman (2005) found that 55 percent of low-income tax filers in North
Carolina who planned to save their refund did not save any portion of it.
III. TAX-TIME SAVINGS INTERVENTIONS AND EVIDENCE
Though there have been relatively few rigorous studies of interventions intended to
promote tax refund savings, the evidence from these interventions demonstrates positive savings
outcomes for LMI tax filers. The Extra Credit Savings program in Chicago gave LMI tax filers
free tax preparation services, an opportunity to open a savings account with a 2.5 percent interest
rate, direct deposit of refunds into these accounts, and a 10 percent bonus for amounts still saved
after one year. The program was successful in increasing account ownership, but not in helping
filers accumulate liquid assets (Beverly et al., 2004). The Refund to Assets program offered lowincome tax filers in Tulsa, Oklahoma an opportunity to open savings accounts and/or split their
refunds into existing savings accounts. Beverly et al. (2006) found a take-up rate of 20 percent
and that participants saved an average of $606, or almost half of their refunds. However, four
months later, most saved refund amounts were spent.
More recent interventions have incorporated incentives to encourage tax filers to retain
saved refunds. Most (70 percent) SaveNYC participants responded to and received a 50 percent
match for allocating and retaining a portion of their refund to savings (Tucker et al., 2014).
Savers were less likely than non-savers to experience financial difficulty in the year following
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tax filing (Key et al., 2015). Modeled after the New York City program, SaveUSA offered 50
percent matches on amounts of refunds low-income tax filers allocated and retained in savings
for one year. Results based on a 42-month follow-up indicate an 8-percentage point increase in
the proportion of filers with any non-retirement savings and $522 more in savings among
treatment compared to control group participants (Azurdia and Freedman, 2016).
The studies reviewed above suggest that opportunities, encouragement, and incentives
can increase the refund saving take-up rate and retained refund savings among LMI tax filers.
However, these studies were conducted with small samples and were not conducted exclusively
with EITC recipients, who are more likely than other low-income tax filers to be single parents
with children who have greater financial challenges to navigate. In addition, savings incentives
delivered in community-based settings may be too costly to implement at scale (Grinstein-Weiss
et al., 2015).
IV. CURRENT STUDY
The (name of initiative) is an ongoing collaboration among (names of collaborating
institutions and organizations), with the goal of encouraging LMI households to save refunds at
tax time. (Initiative) collaborators test interventions informed by behavioral economics and
delivered through (name of software) tax filing software to encourage filers to deposit a portion
of their federal tax refunds into a savings vehicle. (Name of software) is a free version of (name
of software) available to LMI tax filers. Randomized controlled trials testing these interventions
have been conducted every year since 2012.
A. Prior Evidence from (name of initiative)
Prior evidence from (name of initiative) experiments conducted in 2012, 2013, and 2015
indicated that LMI tax filers who received motivational messages (e.g., encouraging filers to
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save for emergencies or for retirement) and choice architecture manipulations (i.e., making
saving all of one's refund the first choice on the refund allocation screen) were more likely to
allocate all or a portion of their refund to a savings account and had higher average refund saving
amounts compared to filers in control groups who received the standard tax filing experience in
(name of software). In comparing different types of behavioral interventions, higher anchors
(i.e., suggestions to save a certain proportion or amount of one's refund) and choice architecture
manipulations had a greater impact on savings outcomes than motivational messages (GrinsteinWeiss et al., 2017a, 2017b; Roll et al., 2018). Several studies from (name of initiative) also
investigated the impact of these interventions on downstream household outcomes, finding that
tax filers who randomly received the savings interventions held more of their refund in savings
than the control group six months after tax filing (Roll et al., 2018, 2019), and that refund
savings deposits were associated with lower reported rates of material hardship six months postfiling (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2016).
B. Testing Interventions Among EITC Recipients
We build on evidence from our prior studies by examining savings outcomes among
EITC recipients and comparing these outcomes with non-EITC recipients for the 2015 and 2016
experiments. In our prior studies, we found that EITC recipients differ from other LMI tax filers
with respect to filing status, age, number of dependents, adjusted gross income, and federal tax
refund amounts. Given these differences in socioeconomic characteristics, it is important to
determine whether EITC recipients' responses to interventions aimed at encouraging tax refund
saving are different than among other LMI tax filers.
In addition, we use a survey experiment to examine EITC recipients' hypothetical
probabilities of deferring refunds based on varying incentive levels, thus allowing us to directly
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inform recent deferred refund saving policy proposals. Our study is unique in that we use direct
observations of savings behavior among a large sample of EITC recipients and we examine the
intersection of an existing refundable tax credit aimed at supplementing wages with an
inducement to build emergency savings.
C. Intervention Overview
In each study year, participants were randomly assigned to one of three interventions or a
control group which received no intervention. Figure 1 summarizes the interventions.
<Insert Figure 1 here>
1. 2015 Interventions
In the 2015 experiments, three unique message-based interventions were delivered after
participants had entered all their information into (name of software) and determined that they
would be receiving a refund. A common heading was used for these three interventions: "Choose
how you'd like your federal refund".
First, in the “emergency savings” condition, the message read "No one knows what life
has in store. In fact, 2 out of 3 people will have an unexpected financial emergency in 6 months
or less. It pays to save!" This message was followed by a sidebar next to the savings deposit
allocation choice that read "Be prepared. Don't let life catch you by surprise. Save something
today and have cash on hand when it's needed down the road".
Second, in the "interactive goal" condition, the message read "Saving some or all of your
refund is an excellent way to set aside money to achieve your goals", followed by a sidebar that
read "Imagine a brighter future today. Then select which goals you'd like to save for most"
Participants then were presented with icons for car/vehicle, house, education, retirement,
emergencies, and other.
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Third, in the "interactive retirement" condition, the message read "Your refund can go a
long way towards saving money for retirement" followed by a sidebar that read "Imagine
yourself at retirement. Then select what you’d like to be doing and start saving for it today!"
Participants were then presented with icons for family time, traveling, volunteering, RVing,
fishing, and relaxing. Nothing occurred when participants clicked on any icons on the interactive
goal and interactive retirement screens.
In all three interventions, participants also received a choice architecture manipulation
embedded in refund allocation options. The first option presented was to deposit the entire
refund into a savings account, followed by options to split the refund among multiple bank
accounts or toward a savings bond, deposit the entire refund into a checking account, or receive a
paper check in the mail.
2. 2016 Interventions
In 2016, three interventions were delivered – also after participants learned they would
receive a federal tax refund under a common heading "Choose how you'd like your refund".
First, a choice architecture-only intervention used the same manipulation as in 2015, wherein the
first option was to save their entire refund, followed by options to split the refund, deposit into a
checking account, or receive a paper check. However, no persuasive messaging around saving
was included.
In the second treatment condition, an emergency savings message was added to the
choice architecture of the first treatment condition. This message read "Don't let life catch you by
surprise. Save something today and have the cash on hand when you need it down the road",
followed by a sidebar that read "Save for life's unexpected emergencies and be ready for: getting
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a car fixed, making up for lost income, paying medical bills, covering legal expenses, repairing
your home." This message had no interactive component.
In the third treatment condition the emergency savings messaging incorporated an
interactive element. Participants were first shown a screen that read "Saving doesn't have to be
that hard…your refund could be just the secret weapon you need to be ready for whatever life
has in store". This was followed by an invitation to "Select one or more expenses below that
might affect you and we'll help you get ahead by using your refund to save" with icons for car
repairs, job loss, medical bills, legal fees, home repairs, and other. After participants made their
selection(s), they continued to another screen with the choice architecture manipulation with a
sidebar that read "Don't let these expenses put your life on hold", displaying their selections from
the previous screen.
In both 2015 and 2016, participants in the control group were asked whether they wished
to receive their refund by direct deposit into a bank account, paper check, or split into multiple
accounts or toward a savings bond, which is the standard (name of software) experience. No
message-based or choice architecture interventions were delivered. To allocate all or part of
refunds to a savings account, participants needed to have an existing savings account.
D. Role of Economic Theory and Behavioral Science in Intervention Design
Content of the emergency and retirement savings messages was informed by economic
theory that emphasizes the role of liquid assets in mitigating hardship (Deaton, 1991) and the
impact of adverse events such as job loss (Lusardi, 1998). Savings messages were also informed
by prior evidence indicating that individuals over-value immediate consumption compared to
saving (Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter, 2010; Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue, 2002;
Thaler, 1981) and underestimate future adversity (Bryan and Hershfield, 2012). Also, individuals
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devote limited attention to making financial and other decisions (Johnson et al., 2012), will use
reference points to make decisions when they are available (Simmons, LeBoeuf, and Nelson,
2010), and can be influenced by persuasive messaging aimed at behavior change (Banks et al.,
1995; Fishbein et al. 2002).
The choice architecture manipulations in 2015 and 2016 were informed by prior research
indicating individuals' tendency to accept default options (Choi et al., 2003; Thaler, Sunstein,
and Balz, 2014). Altering choice architecture by limiting the options to ones that are financially
beneficial was found effective in facilitating Medicare Part D plan decisions (Congdon et al.,
2011), while making retirement saving the default option boosted take-up rates in retirement
plans (Benartzi and Thaler, 2007; Beshears et al., 2009; Choi et al., 2003).
E. Study Purpose
The purpose of the current study was to assess savings outcomes among a sub-sample of
2015 and 2016 (name of initiative) participants who received the EITC and to compare these
outcomes to other LMI tax filers who did not receive the EITC. Prior studies have not examined
savings outcomes solely among EITC recipients, many of whom are single parents with children
who face elevated risk for economic instability and insecurity, nor have savings outcomes among
EITC recipients been compared to non-recipients with similar incomes. We also conducted a
survey experiment to assess the probability that EITC recipients would defer a portion of their
refund to receive a savings match. Findings from our study can inform current policy proposals
aimed at promoting economic security among EITC recipients (Bellisle and Marzahl, 2015; Edin
et al., 2014; Holt, 2015).
V. METHODS
A. Sample and Experimental Design
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Samples for the current study were comprised of 2015 (n = 270,891) and 2016 (n =
112,562) (name of initiative) participants who received the EITC. In addition, a sample of 3,979
EITC recipients who completed a household financial survey in 2016 was drawn to assess refund
deferral preferences based on randomly assigned hypothetical savings match conditions. Study
samples are drawn from the larger 2015 (n = 646,116) and 2016 (n = 284,125) (name of
initiative) participant samples of LMI tax filers who filed their federal income taxes using (name
of software), expected to receive a refund, and were randomly assigned to an intervention group
described above or to a control group (see Figure 1). Assignment took place within the (name of
software), after participants completed their federal income tax returns and learned they would
receive a refund. (Name of software) users who were not due a refund were not part of the study.
1. Survey Experiment Regarding Deferral Preferences
To assess EITC recipients' refund deferral and savings match preferences, we randomly
assigned survey respondents to see one of three different hypothetical questions in the 2016
household financial survey. Each of these questions asked about their willingness to save (defer)
20 percent of their refund for six months, but the three groups of respondents were randomized
to see this question with either no deferred refund saving match, or a 25 or 50 percent match. In
the no match condition, participants were asked: "Many people get a financial boost from tax
refunds but find themselves short on funds later in the year. Imagine a program that allows you
to put off a portion of your refund and receive it 6 months later. You just completed your taxes
and expect a $(amount) refund. If you had the following options today, which would you choose
to do?"1 The amount was populated with their self-reported federal tax refund amount. Response

While this question populates a refund amount based on the respondents’ self-reported federal tax refund amount,
we take the refund measure used in this analysis from administrative tax data. The use of administrative data for
refund amount allows us to avoid issues of nonresponse to the survey question on refund amount and is a more
accurate measure of what respondents actually received as a refund. In practice, this distinction makes very little
1
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choices included to receive their full refund at tax time or to receive 80 percent of their expected
refund at tax time and the remaining 20 percent six months later.
In the 25 and 50 percent match conditions, participants were asked: "Many people get a
financial boost from tax refunds but find themselves short on funds later in the year. Imagine a
program that offers one bonus dollar for every two/four dollars of your refund if you wait 6
months to receive it. Your total tax refund would be larger, but you would have to wait 6 months
to receive some of it. You just completed your taxes and expect a $(amount) refund. If you had
the following options today, which would you choose to do?" Response choices included to
receive their full refund at tax time or to receive 80 percent of their expected refund at tax time
and the remaining 20 percent six months later plus either a 25 or 50 percent match.
Because participants were re-sampled based on EITC recipient status for the savings
interventions and survey experiments, we conducted group balance checks using normalized
difference scores using the following formula:

X =

X1 − X 0
S 02 + S12

,

where the numerator is the absolute difference in treatment and control group means and the
denominator is the square root of the sum of treatment and control group sample variances.
Scores greater than .25 are considered to indicate sample imbalance (Imbens and Wooldridge,
2009). We assessed imbalance for age, gross income, filing status, number of dependents, filing
date, refund amount, income from wages, unemployment benefits, retirement benefits, interest,
and dividends. Normalized treatment-control group differences for the 2015 and 2016

difference to our analysis. Models incorporating self-reported refund amount are almost identical to models that use
administrative tax data, and the correlation between the self-reported refund amount and the administrative refund
amount is 0.95.
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intervention and survey experiment samples were no higher than 0.031, far below the standard of
.25 (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009), indicating that randomization was kept intact after resampling on EITC receipt status.
B. Data and Analysis
Study data concerning savings outcomes are from administrative tax data collected on
federal income tax returns completed in 2015 and 2016 for tax years 2014 and 2015,
respectively. These data were available in aggregate form, with sub-group aggregation by EITC
status and treatment and control group assignment. Data regarding participants' preferences for
deferring a portion of their refunds were derived from a household financial survey that was
completed by 3,979 EITC recipients in 2016 who agreed to complete the survey after they filed
their taxes.
We used two dependent variables to estimate average treatment effects for refund savings
outcomes: (1) the refund saving take-up rate, measured by the proportion of participants who
allocated all or a part of their refund to a savings account; and (2), the amount of refund allocated
to a savings account. Whereas y denotes each savings outcome and w group assignment (1 =
treatment; 0 = control), average treatment effects (ATE) for interventions are estimated:
E (y | w = 1) - E (y | w = 0) = E (y1) - E (y0) = ATE
To assess outcomes, we estimated the ATE using chi square tests of independence (χ2)
and independent samples t-tests for refund saving take-up and refund savings amounts,
respectively, comparing intervention and control group participants. In addition, to detect effect
size heterogeneity, we examined both savings outcomes across five refund quantiles for the 2015
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sample.2 That is, treatment-control group differences were examined to determine whether
treatment effects varied based on the size of the refund.
For refund saving take-up rates, we calculated effect size using a binomial effect size
display, the resulting percentage of which was transformed into Cohen's d (Lenhard and
Lenhard, 2016; Rosenthal and Rubin, 1982). For refund savings amount, we calculated Cohen's d
using standardized mean differences between the intervention and control group.
To analyze responses to the survey experiment concerning hypothetical refund saving
matches, we used linear probability modeling to examine deferral preferences as binary
outcomes (Hellevik, 2009), assigning a value of '1' to defer 20 percent of the expected refund,
and '0' to receive the entire refund at tax time. We estimate three models in this analysis: An
unadjusted model examining the relationship between match rate and deferral preferences; a
model in which we control for refund quantile, age, income, filing status, number of dependents,
race/ethnicity, gender, home, credit card, and bank account ownership, taxes withheld, budgeting
habits, ability to come up with $2,000 in an emergency, material hardship and financial shocks in
the prior six months, and health insurance status; and a model that explores the interaction
between refund quantile and match rate, controlling for the above demographic and financial
characteristics.
VI. RESULTS
A. Sample Characteristics
Characteristics of the 2015 and 2016 study samples are presented in Table 1, including
comparisons of EITC recipients and non-recipients. Differences in characteristics between the
2015 and 2016 samples and between the treatment and control groups in each year were

2

Data limitations prevent us from conducting this same analysis for the 2016 sample.
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negligible. Annual income was low – averaging around $16,000, slightly higher than the
estimated median adjusted gross income ($14,6863) of all EITC filers in the U.S. (Brookings
Institution, 2018).
<Insert Table 1 Here>
Average refunds were substantial, representing almost a quarter of income. About half of
the samples in each year claimed head of household tax filing status – the same as for all U.S.
EITC filers (Brookings Institution, 2018), which typically denotes a household headed by a
single adult parent with one or more children or other dependents. Compared to U.S. EITC filers
(Brookings Institution, 2018), the samples were comprised of a larger proportion of single filers
(33 to 34 percent vs. 26 percent) and a smaller proportion of married filing jointly filers (14 to 16
percent vs. 24 percent).
In both 2015 and 2016, tax filers in the studies differed significantly based on EITC
status. Compared to non-recipients, EITC recipients were older, less likely to have single filing
status, and more likely to have head of household or married filing jointly filing status.
Recipients also had more dependents, higher incomes, and higher tax refunds.
Saving Outcomes
In this section, we present results of randomly assigned interventions in 2015 and 2016 to
encourage EITC recipients to save their tax refunds. Savings rates among participants who
received an intervention were higher than the control group in both years by about 3 to 4
percentage points (p < .001). Savings rates among the three intervention groups in both years
were similar, with effect sizes ranging from .10 to .14 in 2015, and .09 to .11 in 2016. Similarly,
average amounts saved among participants who received an intervention were higher than the

3

Authors' calculation of the weighted average median adjusted gross income for all 50 states and the District of
Columbia.
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control group by close to or more than $100 in both years (p < .001), with effect sizes ranging
from .08 to .10 in 2015, and .06 to .08 in 2016 (see Tables 2 and 3).
<Insert Tables 2 and 3 here>
Savings Outcomes by Refund Amounts: 2015 Sample
To examine whether savings outcomes vary based on the size of one's tax refund, we
present treatment-control group differences in refund savings take-up rates by refund quantiles in
Table 4. Statistically significant average treatment effects were found for all quantiles, and the
rate of refund savings increases with the quantile of the refund. However, the intervention
appears to be somewhat less effective at motivating savings deposits for those with larger
refunds, as indicated by slightly smaller effect sizes for those in the third quantile and above.
Take-up rates increased modestly for both groups as refund amounts increased.
<Insert Table 4 here>
EITC and non-EITC Recipient Savings Rates
We also compare whether refund savings rates differ based on whether tax filers received
the EITC. In 2015, the refund savings rate among non-EITC recipients was 9.87, 14.79, 14.91,
and 14.16 percent among the control, emergency saving, interactive goal, and interactive
retirement groups, respectively. Each of these savings rates was significantly higher than the rate
among EITC recipients (p < .001). Overall, the refund savings rate was 10.52 and 12.53 percent
among EITC and non-EITC recipients, respectively.
In 2016, the refund savings rate among non-EITC recipients was 8.87, 14.35, 13.64, and
13.31 percent among the control, emergency saving, interactive goal, and interactive retirement
groups, respectively. Each of these savings rates was significantly higher than the rate among
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EITC recipients (p < .001). Overall, the refund savings rate was 12.35 and 15.52 percent among
EITC and non-EITC recipients, respectively.
Survey Experiment: Refund Deferral Preferences and Savings Match Rates
In this section, we present the results of a survey-based experiment assessing the
relationship between potential EITC match rates and participants’ willingness to defer 20 percent
of their refund for six months. Table 5 presents the unadjusted results of this experiment.
Overall, 21 percent of 2016 EITC recipients in the survey said they would defer 20 percent of
their refund for six months without the offer of a match. With a 25 and 50 percent match, these
hypothetical deferral take-up rates rose to 70 and 80 percent, respectively. Hypothetical deferral
take-up rates increased across all three match conditions with refund size. The percentage point
difference between the 25 percent and no match conditions increased with refund size, yet
decreased for the difference between the 25 and 50 percent match conditions.
<Insert Table 5 here>
Table 6 presents regression estimates of the relationship between match rates and refund
deferral preferences among EITC recipients. Model 1 estimates this relationship without the use
of any controls, Model 2 includes controls for the quantile of the refund amount as well as an
array of other demographic and financial controls, and Model 3 incorporates an interaction
between the refund quantile and the match rate. In Model 1, the unadjusted relationship between
match rate and refund deferral preferences is identical to that seen in Table 5—the inclusion of a
25 or 50 percent match increases the reported probability of deferral by 48 and 59 percentage
points, respectively (p < .001).4 Model 2 demonstrates that the inclusion of controls does not
affect these estimates, and that respondents with higher refunds have significantly higher

4

F-tests show that the reported deferral response to the 50 percent match rate is significantly higher than the 25
percent match rate in all models (p < .001).
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reported deferral rates. Compared to participants in the first quantile for refund amount,
participants in the third, fourth, and fifth quantiles had 8, 16, and 18 percent greater probabilities
of deferring their refund (p < .001).
The incorporation of interaction terms between refund quantile and the deferral match
rate in Model 3 assesses the degree to which refund size moderates respondents’ response to
match rates, controlling for other factors. Except for the coefficient on the interaction between a
25 percent match and the fifth refund quantile (p < .05), the interaction between match rate and
refund size is not statistically significant, indicating that the response to different refund match
rates is not sensitive to the size of the refund.
<Insert Table 6 here>
Figure 2 incorporates the Model 3 estimates to illustrate the predicted probability of
refund deferral as a function of deferral match rate and refund quantile. The patterns in predicted
probabilities reinforce the patterns observed in the regressions: Reported deferral rates increase
as both match rate and refund size increase. This figure also indicates that, directionally
speaking, a 50 percent match rate may be more effective at incentivizing deferral among those
with lower refunds and that those with higher refunds are less responsive to the shift from a 25
percent match to a 50 percent match.
<Insert Figure 2 here>
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we investigate impacts on tax refund saving of behavioral interventions
delivered through an electronic tax preparation platform among two samples of EITC recipients
representing nearly 400,000 households. We discover statistically significant main treatment
effects on refund saving take-up and amounts across all interventions delivered in both sample
years. Participants who received a behavioral intervention saved $7.3 million and $8.1 million
21

more than participants in the control group in 2015 and 2016, respectively. Effect sizes ranged
from .06 to .14 and are based on direct observations of savings behavior impacted by a low-touch
and low-cost intervention with the potential for scale to reach hundreds of thousands of other
EITC recipients. While the effect sizes are modest, they are observed in the context of a
relatively inexpensive and large-scale intervention. Though a cost estimate for including savings
messages and a modified choice architecture in online tax filing software is not available, the fact
that these interventions do not substantially alter the online tax filing experience indicates that
the marginal cost of implementing these changes is minimal. This suggests that low-touch
message-based and choice architecture interventions could be a cost effective strategy for
promoting tax-time savings.
In comparing interventions, some instructive differences in impact emerge. In 2015, the
emergency saving intervention performs slightly better than the interactive goal and interactive
retirement interventions. This finding suggests that EITC recipients may be more responsive to
messages encouraging preparation for near term, unexpected events versus longer range financial
goals. Corroborating this finding, the emergency saving messages (both interactive and noninteractive) delivered in 2016 performed better than the choice architecture-only intervention.
However, these differences were modest.
Overall, (name of initiative) interventions resulted in three to four percentage point
increases in refund savings take-up and modest refund savings increases of around $100 among
EITC recipients. From the 2015 sample, we see that these results are stable across refund
quantiles, suggesting that EITC recipients can be encouraged to save regardless of the size of
their expected tax refund. The impact on savings we find suggests some preference for liquidity
and prior research indicates that making savings deposits (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2016) and
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having savings Brobeck, 2008; Gjertson, 2016; Tach et al., 2018) – even if held for short periods
– reduces risk for material hardship. While saved refunds may provide EITC recipients with
resources to help cope with economic instability, they may also view EITC refunds as
precautionary savings built up throughout the year to address deferred repairs, purchases,
expenses, and bills (Jones, 2012).
Despite the impacts we observe, the overall refund saving take-up rate is low and even
lower among EITC recipients compared to other LMI filers, likely a result of EITC recipients'
competing priorities for allocating tax refunds (see, for example, Halpern-Meekin et al., 2015).
Indeed, some households may wish to pay down unsecured debt first (Shaefer et al., 2013),
having used credit cards to smooth consumption throughout the year (Jones and Michelmore,
2016). Compared to non-recipients, EITC recipients in our study are more heavily comprised of
unmarried parents with dependent children who may face greater barriers to saving tax refunds.
Also, the average treatment effect of around $100 in increased refund savings we found is
less than a month's rent for most LMI households. Though this amount could provide food
during a spell of joblessness or help pay for a minor car repair, our finding suggests the need for
additional incentives to make refund saving economically meaningful.
To examine the role of incentives, we assess probabilities that EITC recipients would
defer (and hence, save) their refund if offered a savings match. We find a very strong proclivity
to save refunds if offered a 25 or 50 percent match. The proportion of EITC recipients who say
they would defer 20 percent of their refund for six months jumps 49 percentage points from the
offer of no match to an offer of a 25 percent match. The jump from the 25 to 50 percent match
conditions is a relatively modest 10 percentage points.
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Our findings concerning refund deferral preferences lend support to policy proposals
aimed at encouraging EITC recipients and other LMI tax filers to save their refunds. Both the
Refund to Rainy Day Savings Act (S.1018) and the Financial Security Credit Act include a 50
percent match on refunds saved or deferred for six months (Halpern-Meekin et al., 2018). We
find a high level of interest in both a 25 and 50 percent match among EITC recipients.
Though refund deferral preferences in response to hypothetical savings matches rise with
refund amount up to the fourth quantile, our tests for moderation indicate that these preferences
are largely insensitive to refund size. This suggests that, despite the phase-in/out structure of the
EITC relative to earnings, responses to savings incentives may be fairly stable by refund size.
While the expressed intentions to save refunds based on the hypothetical incentives we
test in our study are encouraging, participants may have been inclined to self-report affirmatively
because they were primed with respect to saving as a normative behavior (Nolan et al., 2008).
Moreover, prior research has found a gap between intended and actual refund saving among LMI
households (Mendenhall et al., 2012; Spader et al., 2005). Many LMI tax filers who may wish or
intend to save 20% of their refunds may find it difficult to follow through when confronted with
competing needs at tax time.
Our study offers important insights into interventions and policies aimed at improving the
economic security of EITC recipient households. Prior research demonstrates that behavioral
interventions can induce positive behavior changes such as retirement savings (Thaler and
Benartzi, 2004), college enrollment (Castleman and Page, 2015) and financial aid applications
renewals (Castleman and Page, 2016). We extend evidence concerning the promise of behavioral
interventions via social welfare programs (Congdon and Shankar, 2015; Richburg-Hayes et al.,
2014) by demonstrating positive impacts among EITC recipients concerning refund saving.
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Nonetheless, there are important limitations of our study to note with respect to refund
saving policy proposals. The data available for our study allowed us to examine treatment effect
heterogeneity by refund size for the 2015, but not 2016 sample. Also, our findings do not
generalize to the EITC recipient population. (Name of initiative) participants are slightly
younger, less likely to be African American or Latino, have slightly fewer children, and have
greater educational attainment (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2015), compared to EITC recipients in
other studies (Azurdia and Freeman, 2016; Jones and Mahajan, 2015; Meyer, 2008; Nichols and
Rothstein, 2016). Moreover, EITC recipients file their taxes in other ways. EITC recipients who
file their taxes online may differ based on unobserved characteristics from EITC recipients who
complete paper returns, or use paid or volunteer preparers.
In addition, (name of tax filing software) requires filers to already have a savings account
to save all or a portion of their expected tax refund. Under the Financial Security Credit Act, in
addition to incentives, tax filers would have the opportunity to open a savings account when they
file their federal income tax returns. This is an important policy feature, as the results we observe
in our study might have been different if tax filers without savings accounts had the opportunity
to open an account as they made their refund allocation decisions.
An additional study limitation is that we do not observe whether participants' refund
savings might have been offset by reductions in other savings accounts or increased borrowing,
nor do we observe whether participants retained their refunds in savings or dissaved in the
months following tax filing. However, we find in prior studies that tax filers who were randomly
assigned to receive an intervention had retained a greater proportion of their refund in savings six
months after tax filing compared to the control group (Roll et al., 2018, 2019). While these
findings do not dismiss the possibility of asset shifting or debt accumulation offsets, we also find
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that tax-time savings deposits are associated with lower likelihood of experiencing material
hardship six months after filing taxes (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2016). Thus, our prior studies
suggest that the refund saving outcomes we observe among EITC recipients in this study may
have a positive impact on household finances in the months following tax season.
Making savings deposits are not the only ways that households set aside money for future
use. For example, individuals construct mental accounts to consider certain portions of their
liquid assets as saved for different purposes (Thaler, 1990). Still, once made, savings deposits
tend to remain (Sikkel and van Meer, 2015). This makes it more likely EITC recipient
households who save their refunds will have resources to draw upon when they experience a
setback such as an expensive car repair or lost wages due to a family illness.
Still, saving refunds may not be possible among acutely constrained households, and may
even be ill-advised among households carrying heavy unsecured debt to finance consumption
(Seefeldt, 2015). Thus, an alternative proposal to deferred savings matches is periodic payment,
where EITC-eligible tax filers would receive a half of their expected refundable credit in
quarterly payments during the year (Holt, 2015). Periodic payment – as well as extending the
EITC to non-custodial parents (Wheaton and Sorenson, 2010)‒has the advantage of boosting
household income to smooth consumption during the year, which may help reduce demand for
unsecured debt. However, prior research suggests that EITC recipients prefer receiving lump
sum refunds at tax time as a form of forced saving (Jones, 2010; Jones, 2012; Romich and
Weisner, 2000; Tach and Halpern-Meekin, 2014). Furthermore, take-up for the periodic EITC
was very low, which led to its repeal in 2010, though Holt (2015) argues that periodic payment
can be structured differently to lower the administrative burden on employers, one of the main
factors behind the low take-up of this program.
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CONCLUSION
In this study, we assess savings outcomes for a set of behavioral interventions delivered
through an electronic tax filing platform with EITC recipients using a randomized control trial
design. Interventions in the 2015 and 2016 experiments positively impacted both savings rates
and amounts, though savings rates were lower among EITC recipients compared to other LMI
tax filers. EITC recipients also showed strong interest in deferring a portion of their refunds if
offered savings matches. Our findings lend support for policy proposals aimed at offering
encouragement, facilitation, and incentives for EITC recipients to save part of their refunds,
which may help EITC households cope with economic instability and reduce risk for material
hardship. At the same time, the relatively modest levels of savings observed suggest that EITC
recipient households are balancing an array of consumption priorities amid low earnings, and
therefore generally have limited capacity to enact large changes to savings behavior. Ultimately,
the EITC can serve as an important buffer for families that can set aside part or all their refund as
savings, and financial incentives could be required to encourage LMI households to forgo current
consumption in favor of savings. To the degree that current-period needs are being met within
households, such improved savings behavior could improve overall well-being.

27

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND DISCLAIMERS
The authors gratefully acknowledges the funders who made this research possible: the Annie E.
Casey Foundation, U.S. Department of Treasury, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., and the Intuit
Financial Freedom Foundation. The (Name of Initiative) would not exist without the
commitment of Intuit and its Tax and Financial Center. We appreciate the contributions from
many individuals in the Consumer Group who worked diligently on the planning and
implementation of the experiment. Lastly, we thank the thousands of tax payers who consented
to participate in the research surveys and shared their personal financial information.
Statistical compilations disclosed in this document relate directly to the bona fide research of,
and public policy discussions concerning, financial security of individuals and households as it
relates to the tax filing process and more generally. Compilations follow Intuit’s protocols to
help ensure the privacy and confidentiality of customer tax data. The views and opinions
expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and
opinions of the funders.

DISCLOSURES
The authors have received financial support for this and related research from the Annie E.
Casey Foundation, U.S. Department of Treasury, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., and the Intuit
Financial Freedom Foundation. This financial support was not received with any non-disclosure
obligations nor do any of the above named funders hold rights to review papers prior to
submission.

28

REFERENCES
Acs, Gregory, Pamela Loprest, and Austin Nichols, 2009. "Risk and Recovery Documenting the
Changing Risks to Family Incomes." Urban Institute, Washington, DC.
http://www.urban.org/publications/411890.html.
Azurdia, Gilda, and Stephen Freedman, 2016. "Encouraging Nonretirement Savings at Tax
Time: Final Impact Finding from the SaveUSA Evaluation." MDRC, New York, NY.
https://www.mdrc.org/publication/encouraging-nonretirement-savings-tax-time.
Banks, Sara M., Peter Salovey, Susan Greener, Alexander J. Rothman, Anne Moyer, John
Beauvais, and Elissa Epel, 1995. "The Effects of Message Framing on Mammography
Utilization." Health Psychology 14 (2), 178-184.
Barrow, Lisa, and Leslie McGranahan, 2000. "The Effects of the Earned Income Credit on the
Seasonality of Household Expenditures." National Tax Journal 53 (4), 1211-1243.
Baughman, Reagan A., 2005. "Evaluating the Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit on Health
Insurance Coverage." National Tax Journal 58 (4), 665-684.
Bellisle, Dylan and Marzahl, David. 2015. “Restructuring the EITC: A Credit for the Modern
Worker.” Center for Economic Progress, Chicago, IL.
Benartzi, Shlomo, and Richard H. Thaler, 2007. "Heuristics and Biases in Retirement Savings
Behavior." The Journal of Economic Perspectives 21 (3), 81-104.
Benhabib, Jess, Alberto Bisin, and Andrew Schotter, 2010. "Present-Bias, Quasi-Hyperbolic
Discounting, and Fixed Costs." Games and Economic Behavior 69 (2), 205-223.
Beshears, John, James J. Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian, 2009. "The Importance
of Default Options for Retirement Saving Outcomes: Evidence from the United States."
In Wise, David A., and Jeffrey B. Liebman (eds.), Social Security Policy in a Changing
Environment, 167-195. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
29

Beverly, Sondra, Daniel Schneider, and Peter Tufano, 2006, "Splitting Tax Refunds and Building
Savings: An Empirical Test." Tax Policy and the Economy 20, 111-162.
Beverly, Sondra G., Jennifer Tescher, and Jennifer L. Romich, 2004. "Linking Tax Refunds and
Low‐Cost Bank Accounts: Early Lessons for Program Design and Evaluation." Journal
of Consumer Affairs 38 (2), 332-341.
Bitler, Marianne, Hilary Hoynes, and Elira Kuka, 2017. "Child Poverty, the Great Recession, and
the Social Safety Net in the United States." Journal of Policy Analysis and
Management 36 (2), 358-389.
Brobeck, Stephen, 2008. “Understanding the Emergency Savings Needs of Low- and ModerateIncome Households: A Survey-Based Analysis of Impacts, Causes, and Remedies.”
(Working Paper). Consumer Federation of America, Washington, DC.
http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/Emergency_Savings_S
urvey_Analysis_Nov_2008.pdf.
Brookings Institution, 2018. "Characteristics of EITC-eligible Tax Units in 2015 by State."
Author, Washington, DC. https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/earned-income-taxcredit-eitc-interactive-and-resources/.
Bryan, Christopher J., and Hal E. Hershfield, 2012. "You Owe it to Yourself: Boosting
Retirement Saving with a Responsibility-Based Appeal." Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General 141 (3), 429-432.
Castleman, Benjamin L., and Lindsay C. Page, 2015. "Summer Nudging: Can Personalized Text
Messages and Peer Mentor Outreach Increase College Going Among Low-Income High
School Graduates?" Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 115, 144-160.

30

Castleman, Benjamin L., and Lindsay C. Page, 2016. "Freshman Year Financial Aid Nudges: An
Experiment to Increase FAFSA Renewal and College Persistence." Journal of Human
Resources 51 (2), 389-415.
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2016. “Policy Basics: The Earned Income Tax Credit.”
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington, DC.
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/policybasics-eitc.pdf.
Choi, James J., David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew Metrick, 2003. "Optimal
Defaults." American Economic Review 93 (2), 180-185.
Congdon, William J., and Maya Shankar, 2015. "The White House Social & Behavioral Sciences
Team: Lessons Learned from Year One." Behavioral Science & Policy 1 (2), 77-86.
Congdon, William J., Jeffrey R. Kling, and Sendhil Mullainathan, 2011. Policy and Choice:
Public Finance Through the Lens of Behavioral Economics. Brookings Institution Press,
Washington, DC.
Dahl, Molly, Thomas DeLeire, and Jonathan Schwabish, 2009. "Stepping Stone or Dead End?
The Effect of the EITC on Earnings Growth." National Tax Journal 62 (2), 329-346.
Danziger, Sheldon, Colleen M. Heflin, Mary E. Corcoran, Elizabeth Oltmans, and Hui‐Chen
Wang, 2002. "Does it Pay to Move from Welfare to Work?." Journal of Policy Analysis
and Management 21 (4), 671-692.
Deaton, Angus, 1991. Saving and Liquidity Constraints. Econometrica 59, 1221-1248.
Desmond, Matthew, and Rachel Tolbert Kimbro, 2015. "Eviction's Fallout: Housing, Hardship,
and Health." Social Forces 94 (1), 295-324.
Despard, Mathieu R., Shenyang Guo, Michal Grinstein-Weiss, Blair Russell, Jane E. Oliphant,
and Anna deRuyter, 2018a. "The Mediating Role of Assets in Explaining Hardship Risk

31

among Households Experiencing Financial Shocks." Social Work Research 42 (3), 147158.
Despard, Mathieu R., Samuel Taylor, Chunhui Ren, Blair Russell, Michal Grinstein-Weiss, and
Ramesh Raghavan, 2018b. "Effects of a Tax-Time Savings Experiment on Material and
Health Care Hardship among Low-Income Filers." Journal of Poverty 22 (2), 156-178.
Edin, Kathryn, Laura Tach, and Sarah Halpern‐Meekin, 2014. "Tax Code Knowledge and
Behavioral Responses among EITC Recipients: Policy Insights from Qualitative
Data." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 33 (2), 413-439.
Epley, Nicholas, and Ayelet Gneezy, 2007. "The Framing of Financial Windfalls and
Implications for Public Policy." The Journal of Socio-Economics 36 (1), 36-47.
Evans, William N., and Craig L. Garthwaite, 2014. "Giving Mom a Break: The Impact of Higher
EITC Payments on Maternal Health." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 6
(2), 258-90.
Fishbein, Martin, Kathleen Hall-Jamieson, Eric Zimmer, Ina Von Haeften, and Robin Nabi,
2002. "Avoiding the Boomerang: Testing the Relative Effectiveness of Antidrug Public
Service Announcements before a National Campaign." American Journal of Public
Health 92 (2), 238-245.
Frederick, Shane, George Loewenstein, and Ted O'Donoghue, 2002. "Time Discounting and
Time Preference: A Critical Review." Journal of Economic Literature 40 (2), 351-401.
Gjertson, Leah, 2016. "Emergency Saving and Household Hardship." Journal of Family and
Economic Issues 37 (1), 1-17.
Grinstein-Weiss, Michal, Dana C. Perantie, Blair D. Russell, Krista Comer, Samuel H. Taylor,
Lingzi Luo, Clinton Key, and Dan Ariely, 2015. "Refund to Savings 2013:

32

Comprehensive Report on a Large-Scale Tax-Time Saving Program (CSD Research
Report 15-06). St. Louis, MO: Center for Social Development, Washington University in
St. Louis. https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/csd_research/603/
Grinstein-Weiss, Michal, Mathieu Despard, Shenyang Guo, Blair Russell, Clinton Key, and
Ramesh Raghavan, 2016. "Do Tax-time savings Deposits Reduce Hardship among LowIncome Filers? A Propensity Score Analysis." Journal of the Society for Social Work and
Research, 7 (4), 707-728.
Gundersen, Craig, and James P. Ziliak, 2004. "Poverty and Macroeconomic Performance Across
Space, Race, and Family Structure." Demography 41 (1), 61-86.
Halpern-Meekin, Sarah, Kathryn Edin, Laura Tach, and Jennifer Sykes, 2015. It's Not Like I'm
Poor: How Working Families Make Ends Meet in a Post-welfare World. University of
California Press, Oakland, CA.
Halpern-Meekin, Sarah, Sara Sternberg Greene, Ezra Levin, and Kathryn Edin, 2018. "The
Rainy Day Earned Income Tax Credit: A Reform to Boost Financial Security by Helping
Low-wage Workers Build Emergency Savings." RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation
Journal of the Social Sciences 4 (2), 161-176.
Hamad, Rita, and David H. Rehkopf, 2016. "Poverty and Child Development: A Longitudinal
Study of the Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit." American Journal of
Epidemiology 183 (9), 775-784.
Hardy, Bradley, Timothy Smeeding, and James P. Ziliak, 2018. "The Changing Safety Net for
Low-income Parents and their Children: Structural or Cyclical Changes in Income
Support Policy?." Demography 55 (1), 189-221.

33

Heflin, Colleen M., 2006. "Dynamics of Material Hardship in the Women’s Employment
Study." Social Service Review 80 (3), 377-397.
Hellevik, Ottar, 2009. "Linear Versus Logistic Regression When the Dependent Variable is a
Dichotomy." Quality & Quantity 43 (1), 59-74.
Hill, Brian, and Tami Gurley-Calvez, 2019. "Earned Income Tax Credits and Infant Health: A
Local EITC Investigation." National Tax Journal 72 (3), 617-646.
Hoffman, Saul D., and Laurence S. Seidman, 2003. Helping Working Families: The Earned
Income Tax Credit. WE Upjohn Institute, Kalamazoo, MI.
Holt, Steve, 2015. "Periodic Payment of the Earned Income Tax Credit Revisited." Brookings
Institution, Washington, DC. https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/HoltPeriodicPaymentEITC121515.pdf.
Hoynes, Hilary, Doug Miller, and David Simon, 2015. "Income, the Earned Income Tax Credit,
and Infant Health." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 7 (1), 172-211.
Hoynes, Hilary W., and Ankur J. Patel, 2018. "Effective Policy for Reducing Poverty and
Inequality? The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Distribution of Income." Journal of
Human Resources 53 (4), 859-890.
Hoynes, Hilary, and Jesse Rothstein, 2016. “Tax Policy Toward Low-Income Families.”
(Working Paper 22080). National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22080.pdf.
Imbens, Guido W., and Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2009. "Recent Developments in the
Econometrics of Program Evaluation." Journal of Economic Literature 47 (1), 5-86.

34

Johnson, Eric J., Suzanne B. Shu, Benedict GC Dellaert, Craig Fox, Daniel G. Goldstein, Gerald
Häubl, Richard P. Larrick et al., 2012. "Beyond Nudges: Tools of a Choice Architecture."
Marketing Letters 23 (2), 487-504.
Jones, Damon, 2012. "Inertia and Overwithholding: Explaining the Prevalence of Income Tax
Refunds." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 4(1), 158-185.
Jones, Damon, 2010. "Information, Preferences, and Public Benefit Participation: Experimental
Evidence from the Advance EITC and 401(k) Savings." American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics 2(2), 147-163.
Jones, Damon, and Aprajit Mahajan, 2015. "Time-Inconsistency and Saving: Experimental
Evidence from Low-Income Tax Filers." (Working Paper 21272). National Bureau of
Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Jones, Lauren E., and Katherine Michelmore, 2016. "Timing is Money: Does Lump-Sum
Payment of Tax Credits Induce High-Cost Borrowing?" (Working Paper).
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2712849.
Key, Clinton, Jenna N. Tucker, Michal Grinstein‐Weiss, and Krista Comer, 2015. "Tax‐time
Savings Among Low‐income Households in the $aveNYC Program." Journal of
Consumer Affairs 49 (3), 489-518.
Leete, Laura, and Neil Bania, 2010. "The Effect of Income Shocks on Food Insufficiency."
Review of Economics of the Household 8 (4), 505-526.
Lenhard, Wolgang, and Alexandra Lenhard, 2016. "Calculation of Effect Sizes." Psychometrica,
Dettelbach, Germany. http://www.psychometrica.de/effect_size.html.
Lusardi, Annamaria, 2011. "Americans’ Financial Capability." (Working Paper No. 17103).
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.

35

Lusardi, Annamaria, 1998. "On the Importance of the Precautionary Saving Motive." The
American Economic Review 88 (2), 449-453.
Mammen, Sheila, and Frances C. Lawrence, 2006. "How Rural Working Families Use the
Earned Income Tax Credit: A Mixed Methods Analysis." Journal of Financial
Counseling and Planning 17, 51-63.
McGranahan, Leslie, and Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, 2013. "The Earned Income Tax Credit
and Food Consumption Patterns." (Working Paper No. 2013-14). Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago, Chicago, IL. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2366846.
McKernan, Signe-Mary, Caroline Ratcliffe, and Katie Vinopal, 2009. "Do Assets Help Families
Cope with Adverse Events?." Urban Institute, Washington, DC.
http://www.urban.org/research/publication/do-assets-help-families-cope-adverse-events.
Mendenhall, Ruby, Kathryn Edin, Susan Crowley, Jennifer Sykes, Laura Tach, Katrin Kriz, and
Jeffrey R. Kling, 2012. "The Role of Earned Income Tax Credit in the Budgets of Lowincome Households." Social Service Review 86 (3), 367-400.
Meyer, Bruce D., 2008. “The US Earned Income Tax Credit, its Effects, and Possible Reforms.”
(Working Paper 2008:14). IFAU-Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation, Uppsala,
Sweden. https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/45762/1/573610983.pdf.
Moore, Quinn, Robert G. Wood, and Anu Rangarajan, 2012. "The Dynamics of Women
Disconnected from Employment and Welfare." Social Service Review 86 (1), 93-118.
Morduch, Jonathan, and Julie Siwicki, 2017. "In and Out of Poverty: Episodic Poverty and
Income Volatility in the US Financial Diaries." Social Service Review 91 (3), 390-421.

36

Moulton, Jeremy G., Alexandra Graddy-Reed, and Lauren Lanahan, 2016. "Beyond the EITC:
The Effect of Reducing the Earned Income Tax Credit on Labor Force
Participation." National Tax Journal 69 (2), 261-284.
Nichols, Austin and Jesse Rothstein, 2016. “The Earned Income Tax Credit.” In Robert A.
Moffitt (ed.), Economics of Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the United States,
Volume I, 137-218. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
Nolan, Jessica M., P. Wesley Schultz, Robert B. Cialdini, Noah J. Goldstein, and Vladas
Griskevicius, 2008. "Normative Social Influence is Underdetected." Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin 34 (7), 913-923.
Ozawa, Martha N., 1995. "The Earned Income Tax Credit: Its Effect and its Significance." Social
Service Review 69 (4), 563-582.
Pew Charitable Trusts, 2015a. "How Do Families Cope with Financial Shocks: The Role of
Emergency Savings in Family Financial Security." (Issue Brief). Author, Washington,
DC. http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2015/10/the-role-ofemergency-savings-in-family-financial-security-how-do-families.
Pew Charitable Trusts, 2015b. "What Resources Do Families Have for Financial Emergencies?"
(Issue Brief). Author, Washington, DC.
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2015/11/emergencysavingsreportnov2015.pdf.
Pilkauskas, Natasha V., Janet M. Currie, and Irwin Garfinkel, 2012. "The Great Recession,
Public Transfers, and Material Hardship." Social Service Review 86 (3), 401-427.
Richburg-Hayes, Lashawn, Caitlin Anzelone, Nadine Dechausay, Saugato Datta, Alexandra
Fiorillo, Louis Potok, Matthew Darling, and John Balz, 2014. “Behavioral Economics
and Social Policy: Designing Innovation Solutions for Programs Supported by the

37

Administration for Children and Families.” (Report No. 2014-16a). Office of Planning,
Research, and Evaluation, Administration for Children and Families, Washington, DC.
http://www.mdrc.org/sites/default/files/bias_final_full_report_rev4_15_14.pdf.
Rhine, Sherrie L. W., Sabrina Su, Yazmin Osaki, and Steven Y. Lee. 2006. “Householder
Response to the Earned Income Tax Credit: Path of Sustenance or Road to Asset
Building.” Working Paper. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Office of Regional and
Community Affairs, and Community Food Resource Center, New York.
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.452.3536&rep=rep1&type=pdf
.
Roll, Stephen, David S. Mitchell, Krista Holub, Sam Bufe, and Michal Grinstein-Weiss, 2017.
"Responses to and Repercussions from Income Volatility in Low- and Moderate-Income
Households: Results from a National Survey." Aspen Institute, Washington, DC.
https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/2017/12/ASPEN_RESEARCH_CIV_03_
digital.pdf.
Roll, Stephen P., Genevieve Davison, Michal Grinstein-Weiss, Mathieu R. Despard, and Sam
Bufe, 2018. "Refund to Savings 2015–2016: Field Experiments to Promote Tax-time
Saving in Low- and Moderate-income Households." (CSD Research Report No. 18-28).
St. Louis, MO: Washington University, Center for Social Development.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/csd_research/604/
Roll, Stephen P., Blair D. Russell, Dana C. Perantie, and Michal Grinstein‐Weiss, 2019.
"Encouraging Tax‐Time Savings with a Low‐Touch, Large‐Scale Intervention: Evidence
from the Refund to Savings Experiment." Journal of Consumer Affairs 53 (1), 87-125.

38

Romich, Jennifer L., and Thomas Weisner, 2000. "How Families View and Use the EITC:
Advance Payment Versus Lump Sum Delivery." National Tax Journal, 1245-1265.
Rosenthal, Robert, and Donald B. Rubin, 1982. "A Simple, General Purpose Display of
Magnitude of Experimental Effect." Journal of Educational Psychology 74 (2), 166-169.
Seefeldt, Kristin S., 2016. Abandoned Families: Social Isolation in the Twenty-First Century.
Russell Sage Foundation, New York, NY.
Seefeldt, Kristin S., 2015. "Constant Consumption Smoothing, Limited Investments, and Few
Repayments: The Role of Debt in the Financial Lives of Economically Vulnerable
Families." Social Service Review 89 (2), 263-300.
Shaefer, H. Luke, Xiaoqing Song, and Trina R. Williams Shanks, 2013. "Do Single Mothers in
the United States use the Earned Income Tax Credit to Reduce Unsecured
Debt?." Review of Economics of the Household 11 (4), 659-680.
Sikkel, Dirk, and Geoffrey JL van Meer, 2015. "Stickiness: The Value of Saved
Money." Journal of Marketing Analytics 3 (3), 147-158.
Simmons, Joseph P., Robyn A. LeBoeuf, and Leif D. Nelson, 2010. "The Effect of Accuracy
Motivation on Anchoring and Adjustment: Do People Adjust from Provided
Anchors?." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 99 (6), 917-932.
Smeeding, Timothy M., 2002. “EITC and USAs/IDAs: Maybe a Marriage Made in Heaven?”
Georgetown Public Policy Review 8 (1), 7–27.
Smeeding, Timothy M., Katherin Ross Phillips, and Michael O'Connor, 2000. "The EITC:
Expectation, Knowledge, Use, and Economic and Social Mobility." National Tax Journal
53 (4), 1187-1209.

39

Spader, Jonathan, Janneke Ratcliffe, and Michael Stegman, 2005. “Transforming Tax Refunds
into Assets: A Panel Survey of VITA Clients in Greenville, Henderson, and Raleigh,
North Carolina.” Center for Community Capitalism, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC. http://ccc.unc.edu/contentitems/transforming-tax-refundsinto-assets-a-panel-survey-of-vita-clients-in-greenville-henderson-and-raleigh-northcarolina/.
Sykes, Jennifer, Katrin Križ, Kathryn Edin, and Sarah Halpern-Meekin, 2015. "Dignity and
Dreams: What the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) Means to Low-income
Families." American Sociological Review 80 (2), 243-267.
Tach, Laura M., and Sara Sternberg Greene, 2014. “Robbing Peter to Pay Paul: Economic and
Cultural Explanations for How Lower-Income Families Manage Debt." Social
Problems 61 (1), 1-21.
Tach, Laura and Sarah Halpern-Meekin, 2014. “Tax Code Knowledge and Behavioral Responses
Among EITC Recipients: Policy Insights from Qualitative Data.” Journal of Policy
Analysis & Management 33 (2), 413-439.
Tach, Laura, Sarah Halpern-Meekin, Kathryn Edin, and Mariana Amorim, 2019. "“As good as
money in the bank”: Building a personal safety net with the earned income tax
credit." Social Problems 66 (2), 274-293.
Tarasuk, Valerie, Lynn McIntyre, and Jinguang Li, 2007. "Low-Income Women's Dietary
Intakes Are Sensitive to the Depletion of Household Resources in One Month." The
Journal of Nutrition 137 (8), 1980-1987.
Thaler, Richard, 1981. "Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency." Economics
Letters 8 (3), 201-207.

40

Thaler, Richard H., 1990. "Anomalies: Saving, Fungibility, and Mental Accounts." The Journal
of Economic Perspectives 4 (1), 193-205.
Thaler, Richard H., and Shlomo Benartzi, 2004. "Save More Tomorrow™: Using Behavioral
Economics to Increase Employee Saving." Journal of Political Economy 112 (S1), S164S187.
Thaler, Richard H., Sunstein, Cass R., and Balz, John Paul, 2014. "Choice Architecture." In E.
Shafir (ed.), The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy, 428‒439. Princeton
University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Tucker, Jenna N., Clinton C. Key, and Michal Grinstein-Weiss, 2014. "The Benefits of Saving at
Tax Time: Evidence from the $aveNYC Evaluation." The Journal of SocioEconomics 48, 50-61.
Weber, Caroline, 2016. "Does the Earned Income Tax Credit Reduce Saving by Low-Income
Households?." National Tax Journal 69 (1), 41-76.
Wheaton, Laura, and Elaine Sorensen, 2010. "Extending the EITC to Noncustodial Parents:
Potential Impacts and Design Considerations." Journal of Policy Analysis and
Management 29 (4), 749-768.

41

Figure 1
2015 and 2016 Interventions
Intervention
Condition
1
2
3
4

2015 Experiment
Control

2016 Experiment
Control

Emergency saving + Choice
architecture
Interactive goal + Choice
architecture
Interactive retirement + Choice
architecture

Choice architecture
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Emergency saving + Choice
architecture
Interactive emergency + Choice
architecture

Table 1
Sample Description: 2015 and 2016 Experiments
Panel A. 2015
Experiment
Covariates
Age
Filing Status1
Single
Head of Household
Married, filing jointly
Widow(er)
Number of dependents
Gross annual income
Federal tax refund
N
Panel B. 2016
Experiment
Covariates
Age
Filing Status1
Single
Head of Household
Married, filing jointly
Widow(er)
Number of dependents
Gross annual income
Federal tax refund
N

Treatment
% or mean (SD)
39.28 (11.91)

Control
% or mean (SD)
39.19 (11.87)

EITC Status
Recipient
Non-Recipient
% or mean (SD) % or mean (SD)
39.25 (11.90)
32.34 (16.99)

33.68
50.63
15.62
<1
1.18 (1.08)
16,589 (10,402)
3,751 (2,725)
202,866

33.60
50.77
15.57
<1
1.18 (1.08)
16,597 (10,409)
3,756 (2,710)
68,025

33.66
50.66
15.61
<1
1.18 (1.09)
16,591 (10,404)
3,752 (2,722)
270,891

Treatment
% or mean (SD)
39.91 (12.19)

Control
% or mean (SD)
39.83 (12.18)

EITC Status
Recipient
Non-Recipient
% or mean (SD) % or mean (SD)
39.89 (12.19)
32.18 (17.66)

33.35
52.04
14.53
<1
1.16 (1.07)
16,660 (10,332)
3,805 (2,758)
88,484

33.22
52.30
14.38
<1
1.17 (1.08)
16,691 (10,325)
3,822 (2,747)
28,078

33.32
52.11
14.49
<1
1.16 (1.07)
16,668 (10,330)
3,810 (2,756)
112,562

90.80
2.77
4.84
<1
0.07 (0.40)
13,946 (9,438)
787 (842)
357,065

91.76
2.52
4.37
<1
0.06 (0.37)
13,222 (9,452)
738 (790)
171,563

Note: 1 There were no cases of married filing separately as this filing status is a disqualification for the EITC.
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p
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Table 2
Average Treatment Effects: 2015 Interventions

Intervention
Control
Emergency saving + CA
Interactive goal + CA
Interactive retirement + CA

n
68,025
67,655
67,761
67,450

%
7.84
11.94
11.15
11.14

Savings rate
χ2
p
639.96
431.98
429.24

***
***
***

d
.14
.12
.10

M
292.50
429.01
406.65
405.69

Savings amount1
SD
p
1259.49
1497.56 ***
1467.31 ***
1461.88 ***

d
.10
.08
.08

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001. 1 Includes allocations to savings deposits, excludes US Series I Savings Bond
purchases. d = Cohen's d effect size estimation. CA = choice architecture.
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Table 3
Average Treatment Effects: 2016 Interventions

Intervention
Control
Choice architecture
Emergency saving + CA
Interactive emergency +
CA

n
28,078
28,085
28,221
28,178

%
7.98
10.75
11.12
10.95

Savings Rate
χ2
p
127.75
160.83
145.50

***
***
***

d
.10
.11
.09

Savings Amount1
M
SD
p
303.49 1293.03
386.49 1432.76 ***
402.83 1464.03 ***
409.25 1489.82 ***

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001. 1 Includes allocations to savings deposits, excludes US Series I Savings
Bond purchases. d = Cohen's d effect size estimation. CA = choice architecture.
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d
.06
.07
.08

Table 4
Refund Saving Take-up, by Refund Quantile: 2015 Interventions

Refund Quantile
1st ($1 - $329)
2nd ($330 - $1,300)
3rd ($1,301 - $2,990)
4th ($2,991 - $3,865)
5th ($3,866 and over)

n
54,205
54,168
54,164
54,182
54,172

Treatment
%
10.03
10.78
11.89
11.99
12.76

Control
%
6.07
6.95
8.37
8.92
9.35

Note: *** p < .001. d = Cohen's d effect size estimation.
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χ2
193.84
168.33
129.32
96.55
113.17

p
***
***
***
***
***

d
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.06

Table 5
Refund Deferral Preferences, by Refund Quintiles: 2016 Survey Experiment

Refund Quantile
1st ($1 - $561)
2nd ($562 - $1,133)
3rd ($1,134 - $2,982)
4th ($2,982 - $5,372)
5th (Over $5,372)
Total

n
672
835
808
793
871
3,979

% Choosing to defer 20% of refund for six mos.
No match
25% match
50% match
13.1
54.3***
73.3†††
15.0
64.7***
75.1††
18.6
68.5***
79.6††
29.9
76.1***
84.1†
28.0
80.3***
86.0
21.3
69.6***
79.8†††

Note: *** p < .001; compared to no match. †p < .05; ††p < .01; †††p <.001; compared to 25% match.
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Table 6
Refund Deferral Preferences: Marginal Effects
Outcome
Model
Refund Deferral Match (Ref. = No Match)
25% Match

Would Defer 20% of Refund
1
2
3
0.483*** 0.482*** 0.418***
(0.016)
(0.016)
(0.040)
0.585*** 0.587*** 0.606***
(0.016)
(0.016)
(0.038)

50% Match
Refund Quantile (Ref. = 1st Quantile)
2nd ($562 - $1,133)

0.040
0.019
(0.022)
(0.037)
0.078***
0.053
(0.023)
(0.038)
0.163*** 0.171***
(0.028)
(0.041)
0.177*** 0.158***
(0.032)
(0.043)

3rd ($1,134 - $2,981)
4th ($2,982 - $5,372)
5th (Over $5,372)
Refund Deferral Match*Refund Quantile
25% Match*2nd Quantile
25% Match*3rd Quantile
25% Match*4th Quantile
25% Match*5th Quantile
50% Match*2nd Quantile
50% Match*3rd Quantile
50% Match*4th Quantile
50% Match*5th Quantile
Constant

0.213***
(0.012)
No
0.269
3,979

Demographic/Financial Controls
R-squared
Observations

0.051
(0.049)
Yes
0.306
3,979

0.073
(0.053)
0.083
(0.054)
0.043
(0.054)
0.104*
(0.053)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.052)
0.003
(0.052)
-0.059
(0.053)
0.068
(0.053)
Yes
0.308
3,979

Note: *p < .05; ***p < .001. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients represent the change in the probability of
deferring 20% of one's refund compared to the reference group for that independent variable based on linear
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probability models. Models 2 and 3 control for refund quantiles and covariates including income, filing status,
number of dependents, race/ethnicity, gender, home, credit card, and bank account ownership, taxes withheld,
budgeting habits, ability to come up with $2,000 in an emergency, material hardship and financial shocks in the
prior six months, and health insurance status.
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Figure 2
Predicted Probabilities of Refund Deferrals by Match Condition and Refund Quantile

Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
No Match

50% Match
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5Q
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Note: These predicted probabilities are derived from the regression estimate in Model 3 in Table 6. This model
includes an array of demographic and financial controls, as well as an interaction between refund match rates and
refund quantile. N=3,979.
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